Taxation of Employment and Stock Purchase Agreements: Alves v. Commissioner by Shorb, Randy R.
SMU Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 6 Special Issue (pages 859-1038) Article 5
1983
Taxation of Employment and Stock Purchase
Agreements: Alves v. Commissioner
Randy R. Shorb
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Randy R. Shorb, Taxation of Employment and Stock Purchase Agreements: Alves v. Commissioner, 37 Sw L.J. 1025 (1983)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol37/iss6/5
TAXATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND STOCK
PURCHASE AGREEMENTS: ALVES V.
COMMISSIONER
ON May 22, 1970, Lawrence J. Alves accepted a position as Vice
President of General Digital Corporation.' Acceptance of this
managerial position obligated Alves to execute an employment
and stock purchase agreement that required him to purchase forty thou-
sand shares of the company's common stock.2 Alves executed the agree-
ment and purchased each share of the stock at its fair market value.3 One-
third of the common stock was subject to a four-year restriction, another
one-third carried a five-year restriction, and the remaining one-third was
not burdened by any restrictions. 4 The stock purchase agreement executed
by Alves and other executive personnel stated that the stock had been sold
"in order to raise capital for the Company's initial operations while at the
same time providing the Employee with an additional interest in the Com-
pany." Since the difference between the fair market value of the stock and
Editor's Note: Unless otherwise indicated all statutory references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, which is codified in title 26 of the United States Code.
Internal Revenue Code sections are cited to the 1976 permanent edition and/or current
supplement of the United States Code, if therein. Otherwise, code sections are cited to the
main edition and/or current supplement of the United States Code Annotated published by
West Publishing Company. All Treasury Regulations are cited by section number and may
be found in 26 C.F.R. (1983) unless otherwise indicated.
1. The name of the corporation was changed to Western Digital Corporation in July
1971. The corporation will hereinafter be referred to as the "company."
2. An employment and stock purchase agreement is often entered into in order to in-
sure that the employee remains in the employment of the company. 1 J. MERTENS, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 6.18 (rev. ed. 1981). For specific requirements of an
employee stock purchase plan, see I.R.C. § 423(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The agreement in
the A/ves case required immediate acquisition of the restricted stock, rather than creating an
option to purchase in the future.
3. The parties stipulated that the fair market value of each share of restricted stock was
10c, which equaled the fair market value of unrestricted stock and the amount Alves paid
for each share. While the Tax Court questioned the accuracy of this stipulation, the parties'
stipulation was accepted.
4. The usual restricted stock option involves a transfer of stock from employer to em-
ployee, with the stock subject to restrictions that usually affect its fair market value. Com-
mon restrictions include a forefeiture of the stock should the employee terminate the
employment prior to a specified date, restrictions prohibiting sale of the stock for a certain
period, and repurchase options retained by the employer. 2 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION § ll.lla (rev. ed. 1982). Some of the stock transferred in Alves
was subject to such restrictions, yet the fair market value of the restricted stock equaled the
fair market value of identical stock not subject to such restrictions. The failure to distin-
guish between restricted and unrestricted stock was the basis for the Tax Court's doubt con-
cerning the parties' stipulated fair market value.
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the purchase price was zero, Alves did not include the receipt of the stock
in his gross income for 1970.
Pursuant to an option granted to the company in the stock purchase
agreement, Alves was forced to sell a substantial number of the restricted
shares at prices considerably higher than the initial fair market value
purchase price.5 Alves reported the gain from the sale of the five-year stock
as ordinary income 6 on the joint federal income tax return that he and his
wife filed for 1974. He did not, however, include as income the difference
between the value of the four-year stock when restrictions on that stock
lapsed on July 1, 1974, and the initial purchase price of that stock.7 Simi-
larly, Alves did not report as income the excess value of the retained five-
year shares when their restrictions lapsed in 1975.8 The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue notified the Alveses of deficiencies in their 1974 and
1975 income tax returns. The basis of these deficiencies was the failure to
report the gains due to the increase in market value of the restricted stock
at the time the restrictions lapsed 9 as required by section 83 10 of the Inter-
5. On June 26, 1970, Technology Ventures, Inc. (T.V.I.) purchased 467,000 shares of
the company's preferred stock and was assigned the repurchase option granted to the com-
pany by Alves and his fellow employee-shareholders. When T.V.I. exercised this option on
Nov. 9, 1973, Alves was forced to sell 4667 four-year shares at $18 per share, for a total price
of $84,006. T.V.I. again exercised this option on June 27, 1974, requiring Alves to sell 2240
five-year shares at four dollars per share, for a total price of $8,960.
6. The appreciation in value of stock received as compensation for services performed
is recognized as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1976).
7. Section 83(a) requires that any appreciation in the value of the stock at the lapse of
the restrictions over the initial purchase price be reported as ordinary income for the year
the restrictions lapse. Id. Since Alves failed to elect to report the acquisition of stock in the
year of the transfer, the appreciation in value of any stock received as compensation for
services was ordinary income Id. § 83(b).
8. The parties agreed that the restrictions on the five-year shares would terminate on
Mar. 24, 1975.
9. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue increased Alves's reportable income for
1974 by $27,535 and by $5078 for 1975. In notifying Alves of the deficiencies the Commis-
sioner stated that the excess of the fair market value of the stock on the dates on which the
stock restrictions lapsed over the I0€ per share paid for it was taxable as ordinary income
pursuant to § 83 of the Internal Revenue Code. In a subsequent amendment to the Com-
missioner's answer to Alves's petition, Alves's deficiency was increased by $16,007.81 to re-
flect the ownership of 7093 rather than 2426 shares of five-year stock on Mar. 24, 1975, the
date the restrictions on those shares lapsed with the market value then at $3.43 per share.
10. I.R.C. § 83 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This section provides:
(a) General rule
If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to
any person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the
excess of-
(1) the fair market value of such property (determined without re-
gard to any restriction other than a restriction which by its terms will
never lapse) at the first time the rights of the person having the benefi-
cial interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property, shall be included in
the gross income of the person who performed such services in the first
taxable year in which the rights of the person having the beneficial in-
terest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substan-
tial risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable. The preceding sentence
shall not apply if such person sells or otherwise disposes of such prop-
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nal Revenue Code.
Alves challenged the deficiencies in the Tax Court, contending that his
purchase was not a bargain transaction" since he had paid full market
price for the restricted stock and that the stock was not issued as compen-
sation for performance of services, thus rendering section 83 inapplica-
ble.' 2 Alves also sought a refund of a portion of the tax assessed on the
gain that he had reported from the 1974 sale, claiming that it should have
been characterized as capital gain rather than ordinary income since the
stock had not been received as compensation for services.' 3 The full mem-
bership of the Tax Court reviewed the case. Held, affirmed: Section 83 is
applicable to restricted stock transfers made in connection with the per-
formance of services by the transferee for the company even when the em-
ployee pays full fair market value (without regard to any restrictions) for
the stock. Alves v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 864 (1982).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 83
A. Early Developments
Restricted stock options were very popular prior to the enactment of
erty in an arm's length transaction before his rights in such property
become transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
(b) Election to include in gross income in year of transfer
(1) In general.
Any person who performs services in connection with which prop-
erty is transferred to any person may elect to include in his gross in-
come for the taxable year in which such property is transferred, the
excess of-
(A) the fair market value of such property at the time of
transfer (determined without regard to any restriction other than
a restriction which by its terms will never lapse), over
(B) the amount (if any) paid for such property.
If such election is made, subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to
the transfer of such property, and if such property is subsequently for-
feited, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of such forfeiture.
(2) Election
An election under paragraph (1) with respect to any transfer of prop-
erty shall be made in such manner as the Secretary prescribes and shall
be made not later than 30 days after the date of such transfer. Such
election may not be revoked except with the consent of the Secretary.
Id. § 83(a)-(b) (1976).
11. For the purposes of this Note, a bargain purchase occurs when stock or property is
transferred to an employee at less than its full market value. The below market price pro-
vides the bargain element in the transaction. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a).
12. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue concluded that the A/yes situation fell "di-
rectly" within the provisions of section 83(a), and that due to Alves's failure to opt for a
§ 83(b) election by including the zero excess as ordinary income in 1970, the appreciated
value of the restricted stock was taxable as ordinary income pursuant to § 83(a).
13. I.R.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. V 1981) provides that a noncorporate taxpayer is entitled to
60% of his net capital gain from gross income. For this provision to be applicable, the gain
must have resulted from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. See id. § 1221 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981) (capital asset defined); 3B J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
ATION § 22.11 (rev. ed. 1980). Property received in compensation for services is not a capital
asset. Id. § 22.12.
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Internal Revenue Code section 83 in 1969.14 The usual restricted stock
option involved a transfer of restricted stock to the employee, usually as a
bonus or in compensation for services, 15 at little or no cost to the em-
ployee. 16 The stock was normally subject to forfeiture upon early termina-
tion of the employment relationship or subject to some other material
restriction.' 7 Initially no specific statutory provisions regulated taxation of
such transfers.' 8 Because of the contingent nature of the transfer the stock
received was generally thought to have little or no ascertainable value. 19
The Tax Court initially followed this rationale in concluding that an em-
14. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33, 34 (3d Cir. 1954) (employee's
sale of stock "warrants" granted by company, taxed as capital gain); LoBue v. Commis-
sioner, 22 T.C. 440, 445 (1954) (option granted to afford employee a "proprietary interest" in
the employer corporation deemed not taxable compensation); Bowen v. Commissioner, 13
T.C.M. (CCH) 668, 675 (1954) (option granted as "proprietary interest" not compensation
for performance of services). See generaly Note, The Non-Restricted Employee Stock Op-
tion-An Executives' Delight, 11 TAx L. REV. 179 (1956) (legal trend of treating transfers
intended to reward employee for services indirectly as nontaxable compensation); Note, The
Valuation of Stock Subject to Repurchase Options and Restraints on Sale. A New Tax Bo-
nanza in Executive Compensation, 62 YALE L.J. 832 (1953) (ramifications of Lehman and
Kuchman decisions).
15. One such option involved the transfer of 10,000 shares of stock at a bargain price
designed to induce the executive to accept employment with the corporation. Although the
stock was restricted only by a vague oral agreement preventing the employee from selling
the stock, the Tax Court's determination that the stock's market value was ascertainable and
that the transfer was in recognition for performance of services, MacDonald v. Commis-
sioner, 23 T.C. 227, 234-35 (1954), was reversed by the appellate court's decision that the
market value was unascertainable, there being no market for that which cannot be sold.
MacDonald v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 1956), on remand, 16 T.C.M.
(CCH) 208 (1956), rev'd and remanded, 248 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1957); see also Edwards,
Executive Compensation. The Taxation of Stock Options, 13 VAND. L. REV. 475, 484-85
(1960) (application of MacDonald).
16. A restrictive stock option is often considered to mean a transfer at "no cost or at a
bargain price." Hindin, Internal Revenue Code Section 83 Restricted Stock Plans, 59 COR-
NELL L. REV. 298, 298 (1974). The option in MacDonald v. Commissioner is a good example
of such a bargain transfer. See also Nolan, Tax Court's Section 83 Decision in "Aves" Criti-
qued, TAX NOTES, May 9, 1983, at 553 (former Treasury Secretary John S. Nolan's analysis
that § 83 was designed to apply only to bargain purchases).
17. Section 83 does not define "substantial risk of forfeiture." According to the legisla-
tive history the determination of whether such a risk exists depends upon the facts and
circumstances. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B.
200, 255; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 501.
Examples of restrictions that seem to meet these requirements include a substantial covenant
not to compete, a requirement that the employee complete an additional period of service,
and other situations in which the employer may require return of the stock. Hindin, supra
note 16, at 306.
18. See Hindin, supra note 16, at 301 (tax savings to employees due to capital gains
treatment of restricted stock transfers); Helpern, The Unexpected Impact of New Section 83-
The Restricted Property Provisions, 24 TAX LAW. 365, 365-66 (1970) (analysis of legislative
purposes and history of § 83); Schapiro, Restricted Property Received as Compensationfor
Services, 22 TAX LAW. 529, 529-35 (1969) (application of Treasury Regulations to restricted
stock transfers).
19. In Kuchman v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 154 (1952), the Tax Court held that the
value of restricted stock at the time of its receipt was not ascertainable and, hence, nontax-
able. Id at 163. Significantly, § 83 does not raise revenue through application to restricted
stock options. The employer-transferor is entitled to a deduction equal to the amount of
taxable income an employee-transferee realizes from transfers in compensation for services
performed. I.R.C. § 83(h) (1976); see Nolan, supra note 16, at 555 (§ 83 would have no
effect on total revenue raised assuming employer and employee are in equal tax brackets).
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ployee did not recognize ordinary income either at the time of receipt 20 or
when the restrictions ultimately lapsed.2' Subsequent Treasury Regula-
tions rejected this approach, requiring recognition of ordinary income
when the restrictions lapsed.22 Upon lapse of the restrictions the amount
of ordinary income recognized was the lesser of the fair market value of
the stock (without restrictions) at the time of transfer or at the time when
the restrictions lapsed. 23 The purchase price, if any, was subtracted from
the fair market value in computing the gain to be recognized. The appreci-
ation in value of the stock above the amount included in the income of the
employee and deducted by the employer was treated as capital gain rather
than ordinary income.24
This unique pro-taxpayer situation 25 evolved in the early 1950s despite
the Commissioner's contentions to the contrary. In Lehman v. Commis-
sioner26 the Internal Revenue Service argued that an employee realized
ordinary income equal to the entire appreciation in value at the time the
restrictions on the stock lapsed.27 The Tax Court rejected this contention,
holding that the termination of the restrictions did not cause a realization
of ordinary income. 28 The court noted that values of shares purchased at a
bargain price are subject to a great deal of fluctuation; consequently, the
market value of the restricted shares was unascertainable at the time the
stock was transferred. 29 Since the future value of the stock at the time of
transfer was purely speculative, the Tax Court held that a determination of
ordinary income at the lapse of the restrictions would not accurately reflect
the compensatory nature of the original transfer.30 Therefore, termination
20. Kuchman v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 154, 163 (1952).
21. Lehman v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 652, 654 (1951).
22. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
23. The employer is entitled to a deduction equal to income realized by the employee
due to appreciated value of restricted stock on the date such restrictions lapse. Nolan, supra
note 16, at 555. In accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) the employee received the
favorable tax treatment of taxation of the lesser excess appreciation of the stock, either at the
lapse of the restrictions or at the time of the transfer. Kuchmnan v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.
154 (1952), involved a bargain transfer in compensation for services performed, and the
employee's realization from this transfer was not taxed as ordinary income. Id at 163; see
also Hindin, supra note 16, at 300-02 (analysis of favorable treatment allowed transferees of
restricted stock).
24. This capital gains treatment of appreciation in value led to favorable tax treatment
and savings for employees receiving restricted stock in compensation for services performed.
See Hindin, supra note 16, at 301.
25. Prior to the enactment of § 83, restricted stock options were more advantageous
than qualified plans because of the favorable tax treatment allowing both a hedge against
future appreciation in value and a deferral of taxation. See Comment, Property Transferred
In Connection With Performance of Services Under Section 83-Effectuation of Tax Reform
Act Purposes, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1272-73 (1971).
26. 17 T.C. 652 (1951).
27. The Service reasoned that since the market value of the restricted stock was unas-
certainable at the time of the transfer, it was taxable at the ascertainable market value on the
date the restrictions lapsed.
28. Id. at 654.
29. Id
30. Id.
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of the restrictions was not a taxable event.3'
Subsequently, in Kuchman v. Commissioner,32 the Tax Court considered
the tax treatment to be accorded employees who were compensated for
services under a complex stock option plan that entitled management em-
ployees to purchase stock at a price equal to one-tenth of its prior par
value. Immediately after the options were exercised, the company ordered
a five-for-one split of the stock. The Commissioner contended that the
difference between the purchase price and the fair market value of the
stock was ordinary income to the employee in the year the purchase was
made. The Tax Court again disagreed, holding that the employee realized
no income at the time of the transfer because the fair market value of the
stock was not ascertainable. 33 The Kuchman decision indicates that an
employee does not recognize income on the bargain purchase of stock at
the time of transfer if the fair market value of the stock is not ascertain-
able. The Lehman decision further holds that the employee does not rec-
ognize ordinary income when any restrictions on the stock lapse, since the
inability to calculate fair market value on transfer makes calculation of the
compensatory element of the transaction impossible. Hence, any apprecia-
tion in the stock's value is to be treated as long-term capital gain. 34 Al-
lowing such a bargain transaction to receive capital gains treatment seems
odd, however, since a transfer in connection with services at less than fair
market value is indicative of a compensatory element in the transaction.35
Conversely, a nonbargain transaction such as that in the Aves case should
receive capital gains treatment in view of the absence of a compensatory
element. 36
The promulgation of Treasury Regulations stating that Internal Reve-
nue Code section 42137 applied to stock option transfers helped clarify the
31. Id
32. 18 T.C. 154 (1952).
33. Id at 163.
34. The employee would report as ordinary income the excess value of the stock in
relation to the transfer price, if ascertainable, either at the time of the transfer or at the lapse
of restrictions, whichever was less. Regardless of which event was deemed taxable, any
additional excess value at the other point in time would be capital gain. See Nolan, supra
note 16, at 553 (transfer to employee at zero purchase price).
35. Courts have uniformly refused to accord capital gains treatment to the disposition
of an asset received in compensation for services. See, e.g., Pledger v. Commissioner, 641
F.2d 287, 293 (5th Cir.) (stock transfer to employee results in ordinary income), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 964 (1981); Cohn v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 443 (1979) (property received by in-
dependent contractor held ordinary income when received as compensation for services); 3B
J. MERTENS, supra note 13, § 22.32. When an employee receives property from his employer
without paying fair market value for it, the inference is that the bargain element represents
compensation for the services rendered by the employee.
36. A nonbargain transaction in which the employee pays full fair market value for the
restricted stock seemed to be outside the realm of § 83. Nolan, supra note 16, at 556 (§ 83
should not apply to transfers at full fair market price).
37. I.R.C. § 421 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 421 generally provides that an em-
ployee who receives stock under one of the qualified stock plans defined in id §§ 422-424 is
entitled to receive capital gains treatment on the subsequent disposition of the stock. Id.
§ 421. Because of the strict requirements in the qualified stock provisions, employers fre-
quently used restricted plans as a more flexible alternative. Hindin, supra note 16, at 299-
300.
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tax treatment to be accorded such transfers.38 These regulations attempted
to control bargain purchases of stock at deflated prices by specifying that a
tax would be imposed only when the restrictions lapsed or the property
was sold.39 A later Treasury Regulation permitted the employee to report
the difference between the amount paid for the stock and the lesser of the
fair market values at the time of transfer or lapse of the restrictions as
ordinary income.4 The current version of this regulation specifically
states that if property is transferred by an employer to an employee, and
such property is subject to a restriction that has a significant effect on its
value, then the amount of gain to be recognized as compensation is the
lesser of
(a) The difference between the amount paid for the property and
the fair market value of the property (determined without regard to
the restriction) at the time of the acquisition, or
(b) The difference between the amount paid for the property and
either its fair market value at the time the restriction lapses or the
consideration received upon the sale or exchange, whichever is
applicable.4 '
These Treasury Regulations fostered the favorable tax treatment
granted the taxpayer in the Kuchman and Lehman decisions. In essence,
the employee was allowed to defer the taxation of ordinary income, yet
hedge against future appreciation in value. Taxability was completely de-
ferred until the year in which the restrictions lapsed. Only then did the
taxpayer have to choose between the applicable fair market values to
achieve the least amount of ordinary gain recognition.42
B. Legislative Response
Congress felt that this choice gave restricted stock plans an unfair ad-
vantage over other employment compensation methods43 and in 1969 en-
acted section 83.44 The House Report indicated that the taxpayer would
not be allowed to defer taxation while hedging against an increase or de-
38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(5).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c)(2)(i), T.D. 6416, 1959-2 C.B. 126, 128; see also Sakol v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 986, 990 (1977) (discussion of proposed regulations that would have
taxed fair market value of stock at lapse of restrictions).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(2)(i), T.D. 6540, 1961-1 C.B. 161, 163.
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(2)(i). This regulation was given retroactive application.
Id § 1.61-2(d)(5) (§ 1.421-6(d)(2) applicable to transfers on or before June 30, 1969). These
regulations were promulgated to remedy bargain purchases specifically, with no mention of
transfers at full market price.
42. Nolan, supra note 16, at 553 (taxability deferred until lapse of restrictions).
43. Congress has historically bestowed favorable tax treatment upon qualified stock op-
tions, yet the restricted stock option, subject to no specific requirements, had become even
more attractive to employees. See, e.g., Kuchman v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 154, 163 (1952)
(employee receiving restricted stock with unascertainable market value realized no income);
Lehman v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 652, 654 (1951) (terminations of stock restrictions held
nontaxable event).
44. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. III, § 321(a), 83 Stat. 487, 588-90
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 83 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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crease in the stock's valuation on the lapse date.45 To curtail this practice,
the taxpayer was required to choose between including in income the ini-
tial difference between the fair market value of the stock, absent any re-
strictions, and the purchase price, or including the difference between
purchase price and the stock's fair market value on the date the restrictions
lapsed.46 The Senate added section 83(b)(2), 47 which required the election
of taxability to be made within thirty days of the initial transfer of stock to
the employee.48 This effectively ended the practice of deferring realization
of income while simultaneously hedging against future appreciation in
value.49 The employee could still opt for a tax deferral by reporting his
income when the restriction lapsed, or hedge against future appreciation in
value, but could not do both.50 Forcing the employee to choose between
these two benefits eliminated the favorable treatment to which Congress
had objected.51
Section 83 has since withstood constitutional challenges under both the
fifth52 and sixteenth amendments. 53 Moreover, the Tax Court has held
45. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86-87 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200,
254-55. The legislative history of § 83 provides that "[t]he present treatment of restricted
stock plans is significantly more generous than ... for similar types of deferred compensa-
tion arrangements." Id at 86, reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. at 254.
46. I.R.C. § 83(b) (1976).
47. Id § 83(b)(2); see S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1969), reprinted in
1969-3 C.B. 423, 502; CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 303 (1969), reprintedin 1969-
3 C.B. 644, 659.
48. The employer is entitled to a corresponding deduction in the year the employee is
taxed regardless of the employee's election to invoke § 83(b). I.R.C. § 83(h) (1976).
49. Hindin, supra note 16, at 303 (§ 83 is in response to "concern for equitable treat-
ment among taxpayers and the elimination of unwarranted tax deferral and avoidance");
Nolan, supra note 16, at 553. Congress realized that enactment of § 83 would not raise
additional revenue; increasing revenue was not the purpose of this section. Nolan, supra
note 16, at 555.
50. See I.R.C. § 83(b) (1976). Section 83(b) allows the employee, at his option, to in-
clude the difference in value and amount paid for the stock at the time of the transfer in
ordinary income for that year. Id Such elections have usually been viewed cautiously since
the employee is, in essence, gambling that the value of the stock will increase. See Helpern,
supra note 18, at 371 (election is normally a gamble); Hindin, supra note 16, at 328 ("[T]he
election . . . allows an unwarranted gamble which serves no rational purpose."); Nolan,
supra note 16, at 556 (employee must be informed of and exercise this option within 30 days
of transfer). A strong reason for not opting for the § 83(b) election is the fact that the tax-
payer may recover only his actual expenditure upon a subsequent loss from sale or forfeiture
of the restricted stock. Moreover, the taxpayer who has previously reported ordinary in-
come pursuant to a § 83(b) election may not deduct this amount even though it was only a
paper gain. Hindin, supra note 16, at 327.
51. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423,
500; H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86-87 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 254-
55.
52. In Pledger v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 618 (1979), aff'd, 641 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 S. Ct. 964 (1981), the taxpayer challenged the validity of § 83, asserting that its
application to restricted stock transfers is arbitrary and violates due process of law. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V (no individual may be deprived of property without due process of law).
The taxpayer asserted that the statute raises a conclusive presumption as to the amount of
income derived from a restricted stock transfer, that this presumption is irrebuttable, and
that the resultant taxation amounted to a deprivation of property without due process. 71
T.C. at 628. The Tax Court concluded that application of§ 83 is not arbitrary and that the
statute was enacted as a reasonable remedy for an area of substantial tax abuse. Id at 627-
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that section 83 will be applied according to its terms even though unfair-
ness and inequity may result in a specific setting.54 Thus, prior to theAlves
case, the Tax Court had rejected contentions that section 83 was unconsti-
tutional on its face or as applied. InA1ves v. Commissioner,55 however, the
Tax Court faced a more serious situation of unfairness to the taxpayer than
it had encountered before.
II. AL VES V COMMISSIONER
The petitioner's payment of full fair market value56 for the restricted
stock separated Alves from previous cases dealing with section 83. The
Tax Court initially considered whether a transfer of restricted stock for
which an employee pays full fair market value is connected with the em-
ployee's performance of services for the company. The court first turned
to the company's initial board resolution authorizing issuance of the
stock.5 7 The minutes of the board meeting stated that the purpose of the
issuance of some of the restricted stock was "to enable this corporation to
obtain qualified employees or directors and to permit this corporation to
compete with other companies for the services of qualified and competent
employees and directors."58 The court stated that the resolution authoriz-
ing issuance of stock to specific individuals who all became company offi-
cials supported a finding that the issuance of stock to those individuals was
related to their employment with the company.59 The court rejected the
contention that shares issued solely to named individuals could have been
issued to obtain funds for the company.60 While the usual restricted stock
transfer involves bargain purchases of stock,6 1 or imposition of restrictions
that make the fair market value unascertainable, 62 the court refused to
28; see also Sakol v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 986, 996 (1977) (same conclusion on similar due
process challenge), aft'd, 574 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
53. Section 83 has been challenged as exceeding the taxation power granted to Congress
by the sixteenth amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. In Sakol v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 986 (1977), a~fd, 574 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978), the petitioner
contended that the statute's disregard of contractual restrictions for purposes of computation
of taxable income taxed income that had not been realized. 67 T.C. at 991. The Tax Court
concluded that the sixteenth amendment is not a limit on congressional taxing power and
that § 83 is a valid exercise of that power. Id at 991, 996.
54. 67 T.C. at 996.
55. 79 T.C. 864 (1982).
56. Alves and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue agreed for the record that each
share of stock had a market value of 100.
57. 79 T.C. at 873.
58. Id. at 866. The Tax Court has held § 83 applicable to the transfer of stock in recog-
nition of services performed even though the transferee was not an employee of the com-
pany transferring the stock. See Cohn v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 443, 446 (1979).
59. 79 T.C. at 873.
60. Id
61. See Pledger v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 618, 620-21 (1979).
62. See Gardner-Denver Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1935), affg Gard-
ner Governor Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1171 (1933), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 763 (1935);
Gresham v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 322, 324 (1982); Cohn v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 443,
444-45 (1979); Cassetta v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 188, 189 (1979); Sakol v. Com-




characterize the employee-purchaser who pays full market value as a pure
investor.63 The court conceded that payment of full fair market value by a
taxpayer for property transferred to him by his employer supported a find-
ing that the property was not transferred in connection with the perform-
ance of services, but stated that such payment was not determinative. 64
The court concluded that this factor was outweighed by the stated pur-
poses of the agreement of raising capital and "providing the employee with
an additional interest in the company." 65 According to the court, this pur-
pose clearly indicated a connection between the stock issuance and the
performance of services. 66 Moreover, the repurchase restriction upon early
termination of the employment relationship indicated a compensatory
transaction designed to guarantee the performance of services. 67 The ma-
jority concluded that Alves would not have received the stock but for his
employment relationship with the firm and that any inference that might
otherwise be drawn from a full fair market value purchase was
inconsequential.68
Having determined that the stock was received in connection with the
performance of services, the court next considered the extent to which sec-
tion 83 applied. The taxpayer argued that section 83 should not be applied
to the mere acquisition of an interest in a company by its employee, but
rather should apply only to bargain purchases. The taxpayer contended
that this interpretation of section 83 is implicit in the language of section
83(b), which refers to the excess of the fair market value of the property
transferred over the amount paid for the property. The court rejected this
reading, however, concluding that in the instant case the excess would sim-
ply be zero. 69 Moreover, the court noted that Treasury Regulation section
1.83-270 specifically states that a section 83(b) election is not precluded
where the transferee paid full value for the property transferred. 7' The
63. 79 T.C. at 873-74. The legislative history indicates Congress had considered the
quasi-investor status of some employees. Congress noted that other stock option plans were
available that allowed employees to invest and enjoy the tax benefits of this status. Such
plans are subject to specific requirements, however, and Congress concluded that allowing
participants of mere restricted stock options to enjoy investor-status benefits was unfair. See
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 120-21 (1969), reprintedin 1969-3 C.B. 423, 500-01;
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 254-55.




68. Id The petitioner contended that language in the legislative history of § 83 defining
a restricted stock plan as one "where the stock is subject to certain restrictions which affect
its value" indicated that a full market price purchase amounted to an investment. S. REP.
No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 500. The court con-
cluded, however, that the statute would apply in spite of any investment motives, so long as
the transfer was in connection with the performance of services. 79 T.C. at 875.
69. 79 T.C. at 877.
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2.
71. 79 T.C. at 877 n.7. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) states that "[t]he fact that the transferee
has paid full value for the property transferred, realizing no bargain element in the transac-
tion, does not preclude the use of [a § 83(b)] election ...." The taxpayer contended that
this language, which was not included in the temporary regulations promulgated by the
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court found that the legislative history of section 83, which indicated that
the section was intended to have a very broad application, also supported
its interpretation. 72 Since purchase at full market price is not one of the
specific transfers excepted from section 83,7 3 the court adhered to the view
that section 83 applies to all transfers of property in connection with the
performance of services. 74 Further analysis of the legislative history of the
section also revealed that Congress added section 83(b) to provide flex-
ibility in the application of the statute.75 The court interpreted this specific
grant of flexibility, in the absence of any mention of inapplicability of the
statute to property transfers at fair market value, as supporting the applica-
tion of the statute in the instant setting.76 The court concluded that the
legislative history clearly indicated that "an election under section 83(b) is
the sole means by which post-transfer appreciation may be removed from
being treated as compensation. ' 77 The court, while sympathetic to the
likely possibility that the petitioner was unaware of his right to such an
election, determined that the inequities of the situation did not warrant
excepting this transaction from section 83.78
In one of two dissenting opinions Judge Fay79 characterized the major-
ity's treatment of section 83 as "an unwarranted extension of the statute."80
Treasury Department, was added in response to its request for a Technical Advice Memo-
randum issued during the course of its initial audit. The court found this contention imma-
terial since the specific language merely clarified what was already inherent in the statute.
79 T.C. at 877 n.7. But see T.D. 7021, 1970-1 C.B. 22 (reportable income equals excess of
fair market value over stock purchase price).
72. 79 T.C. at 876 (quoting S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 120-21 (1969), re-
printed in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 500-01).
73. I.R.C. § 83(e) (1976) provides:
(e) Applicability of section
This section shall not apply to-
(1) a transaction to which section 421 applies,
(2) a transfer to or from a trust described in section 401(a) or a trans-
fer under an annuity plan which meets the requirements of section
404(a)(2),
(3) the transfer of an option without a readily ascertainable fair mar-
ket value, or
(4) the transfer of property pursuant to the exercise of an option with
a readily ascertainable fair market value at the date of grant.
74. 79 T.C. at 876; see S. REP. No. 522, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 120-21 (1969), reprinted in
1969-3 C.B. 423, 500-01.
75. S. REP. No. 522, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 502.
76. 79 T.C. at 879.
77. Id. at 877.
78. Id at 879. The Tax Court has applied § 83 to other situations with resulting inequi-
ties. See Pledger v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 618 (1979) (application of § 83 to stock restricted
only by federal securities law), aft'd, 641 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964
(1981); Sakol v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 986 (1977) (measuring income derived from transfer
without regard to restrictions imposed by coltract), afl'd, 574 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 859 (1978). These situations, however, did involve bargain purchases or transfers
of stock. Extension of such inequitable application to the full fair market price purchase
transfer in Ayes is questionable.
79. Judge Fay was joined in this dissent by Judges Featherston, Goffe, and Hamblen.
80. 79 T.C. at 881. The majority opinion in Aires acknowledged that every previous
case dealing with § 83 involved bargain purchases. Id at 878; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
2(a) (extending application of § 83).
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As Judge Fay read section 83, the presence of a bargain element was nec-
essary to trigger application of the statute.8 ' Since the parties had stipu-
lated that the restricted stock's market value was equal to that of
unrestricted stock,82 Judge Fay concluded that Alves had paid fair market
price for the stock so that no bargain element was present.8 3 Moreover,
where fair market value is paid for the transferred stock, according to
Judge Fay, no part of the transfer is related to the performance of services
and section 83 by its terms does not apply.8 4 Thus, purchase at full market
price could not result in any compensation for performance of services, but
was merely an equity investment in the company.8 5 Under this type of
analysis the petitioner would be afforded the benefits of investor status,8 6
since he realized no bargain element from his employment relationship
with the company.87
In noting the petitioner's failure to opt for a section 83(b) election, Judge
Fay examined the Treasury Regulation that provides that the election
under section 83(b) is not precluded when "full value" is paid for the
stock.88 Noting that "full value" is not defined in the Treasury Regulation,
Judge Fry suggested that if it means fair market value without regard to
any restrictions, the regulation will only serve as a trap for the unin-
formed.89 Judge Fay argued that a taxpayer reading section 83(b) would
be unlikely to make such an election when he had paid full market value
for the stock and thus had nothing to include in gross income. 90 Moreover,
he thought it unlikely that Congress had intended to require a taxpayer "to
elect to include something in gross income when that taxpayer had nothing
to include." 9' Judge Fay concluded that in view of the statutory purpose
81. 79 T.C. at 880.
82. Id Because General Digital Corporation was an unknown entity with no prior rep-
utation or references, the requisite demand for the corporation's stock probably did not ex-
ist. When considered with the strict California securities laws, this fact probably accounts
for the estimation of full market price equalling the amount paid for restricted stock. Id at
869 n.2; see also id at 885 (Whitaker, J., dissenting) (concluding that stipulation effectively
removed A/lves transfer from the scope of § 83).
83. Id at 880.
84. Id
85. Id
86. As an investor, any appreciation in value would be taxed as capital gain rather than
as ordinary income.
87. The employee's payment of full fair market price is consideration for the transfer of
the shares. He is not tendering performance of services as consideration. He fulfills the
same contractual obligation in exchange for transfer of the shares as the investor does, that
obligation being payment of full fair market price. See Nolan supra note 16, at 555 (con-
cluding that/iyes situation employee is entitled to investor status t~x treatment).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a).
89. 79 T.C. at 881; see Nolan, supra note 16, at 556. Judge Fay concluded that if "full
value" means "fair market value [of the stock] without regard to the restriction, the regula-
tion is . . .an unwarranted extension of the statute .... " 79 T.C. at 880-81. Prior to
promulgation of Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) in 1978, the regulation did not state that § 83 ap-
plied to transfers in which full market price was paid by the employee-transferee. 79 T.C. at
881 n.l.
90. 79 T.C. at 881; see also Nolan, supra note 16, at 555-56 (majority's reading of § 83
only penalizes uninformed).
91. 79 T.C. at 881.
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of curbing the benefits of bargain or deflated price purchases, application
of section 83 to full market price purchases stretched the statute beyond its
intended scope. 92
The second dissent in.4/ves was written by Judge Whitaker.93 In chal-
lenging the majority's conclusion that the stock was transferred "in con-
nection with the performance of services," Judge Whitaker noted that the
statute does not define that phrase.94 Judge Whitaker therefore turned to
the legislative history of the statute in an effort to determine the congres-
sional intent underlying the phrase. As an initial proposition, the House
Report regarding section 83 states that "if property is transferred subject to
a restriction which has a significant effect on value," the procedure dic-
tated by section 83(a) is applicable. 95 Based on this and similar language
in the Senate Report,96 Judge Whitaker concluded that property is not to
be deemed issued in connection with the performance of services unless on
the transfer date there is a discrepancy between the fair market value of
the property subject to the restrictions and its fair market value without
restrictions.97 This determination is consistent with prevention of the per-
ceived abuse that section 83 was designed to cure. If no discrepancy in
value existed on the transfer date, then there was no tax to defer and no tax
avoidance motive to combat.98 Since the parties in A/ves agreed that the
transaction was a full fair market value purchase, no bargain was involved,
and the employee owed no tax.99 Judge Whitaker did note, however, that
the parties had erroneously focused on the amount paid for the stock and
not the parameters of the statute. °0 Judge Whitaker found this to be a
result of the "artificial" stipulation of the parties, since common sense
plainly indicated that the restricted stock would have a lesser value than
the shares without the restrictions.' 0 ' In view of the stipulation, however,
Judge Whitaker concluded that the restrictions had not affected the value
of the stock, and section 83 could not apply. 102
92. Id
93. Judges Featherston and Goffe also joined in Judge Whitaker's dissent.
94. 79 T.C. at 883.
95. H.R. REP. No. 413 (pt. 2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B.
340, 376.
96. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 500.
97. 79 T.C. at 887.
98. When there is no avoidance of tax, as in the Alves case, a legislative cure is unneces-
sary. While Judge Whitaker questioned the stipulation entered into by the parties concern-
ing the fair market value of the restricted shares, he nonetheless concluded that this fact
removed the case from the operation of § 83. Id
99. See I J. MERTENS, supra note 2, § 5.13; Nolan, supra note 16, at 556.
100. 79 T.C. at 887.
101. Id
102. Id. Although Judge Whitaker acknowledged the value of a § 83(b) election under
certain nonbargain transactions, such an election would be frivolous in situations like that in
Alves. Every informed taxpayer (employee-investor) would file an election within the re-
quired 30-day period. Only the uninformed taxpayer is penalized. Id; see also Nolan,
supra note 16, at 556 (distinguishing between employees who receive sophisticated tax ad-
vice and those who do not).
Counsel for the petitioner filed an appellant brief with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
on Sept. 15, 1983. A hearing will be scheduled after receipt of the appellee's brief. The
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III. CONCLUSION
The increase in popularity of restricted stock plans resulting from the
capital gains treatment of appreciation in value warranted the enactment
of section 83. The Tax Court, by applying section 83 broadly to nonbar-
gain transfers, has discriminated against employees who pay full market
price for restricted stock. The outside investor who purchases unrestricted
stock may report the long-term appreciation in value as capital gain. The
employee who pays the same price for restricted stock, that is, fair market
value without regard to any restrictions, should be entitled to similar treat-
ment. Under the decision in Alves v. Commissioner, however, the em-
ployee-investor is required to report such appreciation as ordinary income
should he fail to exercise the section 83(b) election. InAlves the Tax Court
held that transfers of stock to employees for full fair market price are made
in connection with the performance of services. Any appreciation in value
of the restricted stock is taxable as ordinary income if no section 83(b)
election is exercised.
Application of section 83 to nonbargain transfers of restricted stock
serves no clear tax purpose. Such an application does not raise revenue or
combat the perceived abuse of too favorable tax treatment of bargain
purchases, but rather results in discriminatory treatment of the employee-
investor. Recognition of the inapplicability of section 83 to full market
price purchases would serve the purpose of that section without any resul-
tant inequities to the employee-investor.
Randy R. Shorb
importance of the case and the discontent of the concerned legal industry are represented by
the numerous amicus curiae briefs that have been filed, including the brief submitted by the
law firm of Miller & Chevalier and written by former Secretary of the Treasury John Nolan.
Telephone Interview with Michael R. Moore, co-counsel for petitioner (Oct. 10, 1983).
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